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PRIVACY ISSUE AND THE NEED FOR THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT TO REFLECT THE MODERN UTILITY
OF THE INBOX
James Palanica† *
Abstract
This Note identifies the divided jurisprudence surrounding the
protection of opened emails from unauthorized access under the Stored
Communications Act and advocates for the interpretation espoused by
the Fourth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Hately v. Watts. The traditional
view of the Stored Communications Act, as employed by the Department
of Justice, neither sufficiently protects opened emails nor reflects the
modern usage of email inboxes. While the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
previously attempted to expand protection to opened emails by
prioritizing user intent, such a standard has proved difficult to manage
and has resulted in disparate outcomes depending on whether one uses a
desktop-based or web-based email provider. The Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Hately protects opened emails regardless of email platform,
but it accomplishes this task by stretching legislative intent to its limit.
As a result, the unauthorized access provisions of the Stored
Communications Act have been fractured into at least three different
interpretations and require a resolution by the Supreme Court or revision
by Congress to uniformly protect emails nationwide.
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INTRODUCTION
There are an estimated 254.7 million email users in the United States
alone,1 and 95% of them say they check their email either “as often as
they should” or “way too often.”2 Despite the frequency with which a vast
majority of Americans check their email, it seems unlikely that many
email users are aware that the privacy of their emails might depend on
whether they have opened their emails or the type of email provider they
use.
From the memorable “Try America Online (AOL)” disks and the
emergence of free providers such as Hotmail3 to the much more recent
rise of the smartphone and wireless high-speed internet, both the ease and
speed of electronic communication have improved. But concerns
surrounding privacy have also increased, especially as to the
government’s ability to acquire emails or other electronic data in the
course of an investigation.4 The recent decisions in Carpenter v. United
States5 and United States v. Dorsey6 were quite noteworthy in that they
berated and declared unconstitutional portions of the Stored
Communications Act7 (SCA), which had previously allowed the

1. eMarketer & Squarespace, Number of E-mail Users in the United States from 2013 to
2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/253790/number-of-e-mail-users-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/SGJ2-4L9K].
2. J. Clement, Frequency of Checking E-mail in General According to Workers in the
United States as of June 2018, STATISTA (July 3, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
911623/frequency-workers-checking-emails-in-general/ [https://perma.cc/ZWG2-AA2E].
3. Kate Hoy, Opinion, This Month in Tech History: Hotmail Launched, IDG CONNECT
(July 1, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.idgconnect.com/article/3581120/this-month-in-techhistory-hotmail-launched.html [https://perma.cc/5J5T-W6LV] (stating that Hotmail was
“[p]roclaimed the world’s first web-based email when it launched on 4th July 1996. The
Independence Day launch aimed to symbolise the ‘freedom’ Hotmail offered—from ISP-based
email as well as the ability to access your inbox from anywhere in the world”).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
5. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
6. 781 F. App’x 590 (2019).
7. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1860, 1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2711).
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government to obtain electronic data without a warrant or probable
cause.8
However, despite the importance of Carpenter and Dorsey in the
United States’ battle with modern technology, this Note is not another
epic of the U.S. Supreme Court heroically lowering the Fourth
Amendment’s shield to protect individuals from government overreach.
Rather, this Note presents the other side of the coin. It is a story of
everyday wrongdoing by private parties against one another. Specifically,
this Note identifies the splintered authority surrounding a commonplace
issue that likely does not cross the mind of either the tech-savvy
millennial or the baby boomer user of Outlook Express: the privacy of
opened emails under the Stored Communications Act and the right to a
civil cause of action for the violation of that privacy in addition to
criminal penalties.9 While courts have recognized that emails intercepted
in transit or sitting unopened in one’s inbox are protected under the
SCA,10 the judicial landscape surrounding the status of opened emails
continues to be inconsistent, allowing, for example, the exposure of a
mistress’s emails to go unpunished in one jurisdiction11 and reprimanding
the search for alleged proof of infidelity in another.12
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Prior to examining the differing interpretations regarding one’s
privacy in open emails, it is important to understand the general reasoning
behind Congress’s enactment of the SCA.13 Why would one’s personal
emails (or other electronic messages) not be inherently protected from
8. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (concluding “that the Government must generally
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records” (emphasis added));
Dorsey, 781 F. App’x at 591. In Dorsey, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the unconstitutionality
of portions of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), specifically § 2703(d). Dorsey, 781 F.
App’x at 591. The government had obtained cell tower data under a court order, which does not
require a warrant or probable cause. Id. “Under the SCA, the government needed to demonstrate
only a reasonable belief that the data was relevant and material to an ongoing investigation. Id. In
light of the recent decision in Carpenter, the court held that a warrant supported by probable cause
was required to obtain this data.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (providing criminal penalties for unauthorized access to stored
communications); id. § 2707 (providing for a civil cause of action).
10. Vista Marketing, LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954, 963–64 (11th Cir. 2016).
11. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 243, 245 (S.C. 2012).
12. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 773–74 (4th Cir. 2019).
13. The “Stored Communications Act” is the common vernacular to reference U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2711. These sections were initially passed under Title II of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, but nowhere does the phrase “Stored Communications Act” appear
in the language of the statute. COMPUT. CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 115, n.1 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE].
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unauthorized access? Why are electronic communications from one
person to another not inherently private?
The average American’s innate sense of “privacy” likely stems from
the Fourth Amendment’s language regarding search and seizure.14
However, while the Fourth Amendment sets forth foundational individual
liberties15 and shields individuals from arbitrary surveillance,16 Katz v.
United States17 recognized that the Fourth Amendment “cannot be
translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”18 Rather, the
Fourth Amendment protects against “certain kinds of government
intrusion”19 and seeks to avoid the development of a police state.20 Katz
further refined the Fourth Amendment as “protect[ing] people, not
places”21 and provided the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.22
Also, Fourth Amendment protections only exist between the government
and citizens, not between private parties.23 As a result, the evolution of
“privacy” in the United States appears to be bifurcated into (1) the judicial
application of the Fourth Amendment and (2) any statutorily
supplemented privacy rights.
Acknowledging that technology and the ability for arbitrary oversight
have both changed since the Founding,24 Professor Orin Kerr25 provides
an excellent overview of why the Fourth Amendment alone does not
provide adequate protection for electronic mail. First, it is unclear
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” (emphasis added)).
15. See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018) (“Few protections are as
essential to individual liberty as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
16. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[T]he Amendment seeks
to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14.
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
22. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the test as “first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
23. See id. at 350–51 (majority opinion) (“[A] person’s general right to privacy—his right
to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
24. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986) (noting that technological advancements over the
past centuries have expanded the possibility of arbitrary government oversight beyond physically
entering houses and seizing personal effects).
25. Professor Kerr’s work and recent Volokh blog post, see Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Circuit
Deepens the Split on Accessing Opened E-Mails, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:05 AM),
https://reason.com/2019/03/21/fourth-circuit-deepens-the-split-on-civi/ [https://perma.cc/2NUDV3MR], shed light on this gap in the Stored Communications Act—and inspired this Note.
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whether email users have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” due to
the way that email functions as a technology.26 Generally speaking, an
email is first sent to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), which acts as a
third party in processing and sending the message onward to the
designated recipient.27 But in theory, when one discloses information to
a third party—in this case, an ISP—the individual cannot be considered
to have a reasonable expectation of privacy and such information loses
Fourth Amendment protections.28 Second, Professor Kerr emphasizes
that rules governing grand jury subpoenas leave emails exposed. Because
grand jury subpoenas—unlike warrants—do not require probable cause,
emails are much more easily accessible from third-party ISPs.29 Finally,
ISPs are usually private third parties and not government entities.30
Because the Fourth Amendment only restrains the government’s
behavior, a third-party ISP can disclose information to the government or
other third parties.31 Absent any supplemental form of statutory
regulation, the Fourth Amendment alone seems to afford limited
protections to email or electronic communications.32
Aware of the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, Congress had
already expressed sensitivity toward technological developments earlier
in the twentieth century.33 Yet by the mid-1980s, Congress became
concerned about the applicability of existing federal law34 to new forms
of electronic communication, such as wireless phones, electronic mail,

26. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1210 & n.11 (citing several Supreme Court cases in support of this proposition).
29. See id. at 1211–12. Because government officials are not often physically raiding an
ISP’s premises, absent more stringent regulation, officials would request subpoenas over
warrants. See id.
30. Id. at 1212.
31. Id. at 1212 & n.22 (citing circuit court cases holding that third-party actors, even when
acting maliciously, do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as they are not acting at the
behest of the government).
32. See id. at 1212. Professor Kerr notes that the internet appears to be “‘custom designed’
to frustrate” Fourth Amendment protections. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986). In 1928, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because no item was physically seized by the government nor did a trespass occur. S. REP. NO.
99-541, at 2. However, in 1967, the Court reversed its logic in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), holding that the Fourth Amendment did apply to government interception of telephone
calls, and in the same year released a decision in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
providing that Fourth Amendment protected citizens from electronic eavesdropping of oral
correspondence. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2.
34. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (referencing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was enacted in response to the Katz and Berger decisions).
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and pagers.35 In response, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
concluded, in an extensive report published in 1985, that the “existing
statutory framework” was not readily applicable to these new
technologies and, specifically, that protections for electronic mail were
“weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent.”36 The OTA report further clarified
that while first-class mail had extensive statutory protections from
unauthorized access both during delivery and when inside mail
receptacles,37 electronic mail did not possess any of these safeguards
during its transit or storage.38 Such a dichotomy presented a significant
issue because the parties that used first-class mail and electronic mail
were (and are still today) identical.39 Consequently, Congress sought to
advance the law with technology in mind to avoid the erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections and to secure privacy for electronic mail.40 As
such, the SCA established “a set of Fourth Amendment–like privacy
protections by statute” to protect electronic mail.41 In accomplishing this
goal, the SCA not only regulates the government’s ability to force ISPs
to reveal information but also limits the circumstances in which ISPs can
voluntarily disclose information to the government.42 To further regulate
private parties, the SCA provides for both criminal and civil penalties for
persons who unlawfully access, alter, or obstruct lawful access to stored
electronic communications.43 Overall, the SCA seeks to strike a fair
balance between citizens’ privacy expectations and the legitimate needs
of law enforcement.44
35. Id. at 2–4. After Senator Patrick Leahy presented the question to the DOJ, the thenAttorney General concluded in 1984 that reasonable expectations of privacy were “not always
clear or obvious” in the context of new forms of wireless electronic communication. Id. at 4.
36. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3, 45 (1985) [hereinafter OTA ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE].
37. Id. at 45; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702, 1708 (providing protections against
unauthorized access of physical mail).
38. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 48–50.
39. Id. at 48 (“Government officials might be interested in accessing or maintaining
surveillance of electronic mail messages for investigative purposes. Private parties might be
interested in electronic mail surveillance for various competitive, personal, and/or criminal
purposes.”).
40. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.
41. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1212.
42. See id. at 1212–13 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703); see also
§ 2703(a)–(d) (providing the procedure by which the government can obtain a search warrant,
administrative subpoena, or § 2703(d) court order (the latter being held unconstitutional per
Carpenter) to compel disclosure from an ISP); § 2702(a)–(c) (prohibiting the voluntary disclosure
of email contents or customer records, except in the process of disclosing such information to the
intended recipients of the emails and certain other enumerated situations, such as in suspected
child trafficking cases).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2707.
44. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.
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It appears that the SCA was well-intentioned in filling the gaps
presented by the digital age. One would wager that most are happy with
the general goal of protecting email in the same manner as first-class
mail,45 setting rules of engagements for third-party ISPs,46 and
sanctioning the unauthorized access of emails.47 However, the devil is
always in the details, or, in this case, in the definitions and conjunctions.48
This Note focuses on the divisions caused by the SCA’s definitions of
“electronic storage” and “backup protection.”49 Such divisions highlight
the courts’ differing views on the SCA’s treatment of “opened emails”—
a focal point over the modern use of traditional or web-based email
inboxes. Further, while the historical development of the SCA has an
emphasis on establishing Fourth Amendment-like protections from
government oversight, recent disputes seem focused on SCA breaches by
private citizens against each other.
II. THE THREE EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS OF “ELECTRONIC STORAGE”
AND “BACKUP PROTECTION”—ARE ANY OF THEM ACCEPTABLE?
This Part seeks to clarify the roughly three differing interpretations of
the definition of “electronic storage” and “backup protection”50 as
applied to opened emails and, in turn, determine whether opened emails
are statutorily protected from unauthorized access under the SCA.51 To
begin, Section II.A discusses the conservative yet splintered opinions in
Jennings v. Jennings,52 all of which held that opened emails are not
protected by the SCA.53 Section II.B then analyzes the holdings of
Theofel v. Farey-Jones54 and Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire
Protection District,55 which struck a middle ground, prizing the user’s
intent regarding “backup protection.” Finally, Section II.C discusses the
recent opinion in Hately v. Watts,56 which attempted to embrace the
45. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 45.
46. See Kerr, supra note 26, at 1212–13.
47. See §§ 2701, 2707.
48. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2012); id. at 247–48 (Toal, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (debating the significance of the word “and”); Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the rule against surplusage to find certain
subsections of the SCA disjunctive rather than conjunctive).
49. See infra Sections II.A–C; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (defining “electronic
storage”).
50. See § 2510(17).
51. See § 2701.
52. 736 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 2012).
53. Id. at 245; id. at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 249 (Pleicones, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
54. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
55. 793 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2015).
56. 917 F.3d 770 (4th Cir. 2019).
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modern use of email inboxes by extending the SCA’s protection to
opened emails, regardless of the email technology used.
A. The Importance of Conjunctions—The Fractured Opinion of
Jennings and Three Different Ways of Saying “No”
The background of Jennings reveals the importance of the legal
distinction between opened and unopened emails. The case invoked a
common scenario, the breakdown of an intimate personal relationship.57
Lee Jennings (Lee) had been having an affair with a woman with whom
he had corresponded with over email.58 After finding a card from another
woman in her husband’s car and receiving subsequent verbal
confirmation from Lee that he had a mistress, Gail Jennings (Gail)
informed her daughter-in-law, Holly Broome (Broome), of the
situation.59 Broome knew that Lee had a Yahoo! email account and
correctly guessed the answers to his security questions.60 Broome found
opened emails between Lee and his paramour, and Broome gave the
emails to Gail’s divorce attorneys.61 When Lee realized that Broome had
accessed these emails, Lee sued Gail, Broome, and a private investigator,
inter alia, for violating § 2701 of the SCA, asserting that his opened
emails qualified as being in electronic storage.62
After reading the facts of Jennings, one might guess that most
individuals would recognize some form of wrongdoing on Broome’s
behalf. Does society’s penchant for drama and reality television have one
screaming at the television to investigate Lee’s alleged mistress?
Presumably, yes. But taking a step back, Broome clearly violated her
father-in-law’s privacy by breaking into his Yahoo! account and reading
his emails, right? Wrong: Broome was not held liable under the SCA.63
Although the five justices of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
admonished Broome’s behavior and emphasized possible relief on
alternative theories, the court issued three different opinions detailing
distinct rationales; however, all of the justices ultimately agreed with the
result that Lee’s emails were not protected under the SCA.64 This Section
explores all three opinions.
57. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 243.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Lee Jennings also sued for invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and violations of the
South Carolina Homeland Security Act. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-135 (2020)
(providing a civil penalty similar to § 2707 of the SCA). Notably, the South Carolina Code uses
the same definition for “electronic storage” as the SCA. § 17-30-15(18).
63. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245.
64. Id. at 245 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 248 (Pleicones, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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First, it is important to identify the contested portion of the SCA. The
SCA punishes unauthorized access to “electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage.”65 The SCA defines “electronic storage” as:
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication[.]66
The words “and” as well as “backup protection” are key considerations
in Justice Kaye Hearn’s analysis and the additional concurring opinions.
With regard to the above-emphasized “and,” Justice Hearn
acknowledged that the “traditional interpretation” of the statute espoused
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is that emails must meet both
subsection (A) and (B) to qualify for protection.67 In this scenario, the
only emails that would be protected under the statute are those that have
been received by the intended recipient’s email provider but that have not
yet been accessed by the recipient.68 Such an interpretation of electronic
storage seems to focus on the technology of email submission rather than
the express intent of the user.69 Justice Hearn noted that a majority of
courts have departed from this interpretation and now accept that an email
can be in electronic storage if it meets either (A) or (B),70 citing Theofel
as the key proponent of the reasoning that opened emails left in an inbox
could be considered “in electronic storage.”71 However, because Lee only
argued that his emails were in electronic storage pursuant to paragraph
(B), Justice Hearn did not commit the court to deciding its preferred
interpretation of the “and” language.72 Additionally, Lee had simply left
these emails in his Yahoo! email inbox and did not copy or retain them
elsewhere.73 In reasoning that “passive inaction” in leaving opened
emails in an inbox did not comport with the plain meaning of “backup,”

24.

65. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 2510(17) (emphasis added).
67. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244; see DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123–

68. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123–24; Kerr, supra note 25.
69. See Kerr, supra note 25. In order to provide uninterrupted services or prevent loss of
data, email/internet service providers often make backups of unopened emails on multiple servers.
See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 50 (mentioning that email providers often
make copies of emails for administrative purposes).
70. § 2510(17); see Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244.
71. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 245.
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Justice Hearn could not classify the emails as being in electronic storage
and therefore held Broome not liable under the SCA.74
Furthermore, Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal’s concurrence advocated
that the adoption of the “traditional interpretation of the statute”75
provides a more equitable application of the law and is most consistent
with Congress’s legislative intent.76 In criticizing Justice Hearn’s
rationale, Chief Justice Toal reasoned that the privacy of opened emails
should not depend on the technology the service provider uses.77 Further,
her reasoning turned on the unambiguous use of “and” in the statute,
which, barring other context, should retain its plain meaning.78 As a
result, Chief Justice Toal reasoned that “electronic storage refers only to
temporary storage [of emails], made in the course of
transmission, . . . and
to
backups
of
such
intermediate
communications.”79 Thus, the only emails that would be protected under
the SCA would be those that are unread. While Chief Justice Toal noted
that this interpretation of the law may be “ill-fitted” to govern problems
of the modern day, she asserted that this view is most consistent with the
legislative history80 and, in turn, she resisted legislating from the bench.
Justice Costa Pleicones provided the third opinion, with yet a different
rationale. While Justice Pleicones agreed that the SCA applied to
temporary storage during communications and backups of those
communications, he argued that they were distinct from one another and
thus must be equally and separately considered.81 The former applies to
unopened emails in transit to the final user, and the latter applies to

74. Id.
75. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 125 (acknowledging both the
traditional understanding of “electronic storage” and the new precedent in the Ninth Circuit under
Theofel).
76. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 246–47 (“[I]f one uses Microsoft Outlook for e-mail, one will be protected, but if
one uses Yahoo! Mail for e-mail, there is no protection.”). Chief Justice Toal emphasized the
difference between desktop email clients and webmail clients. A desktop email client is a piece
of software that pulls emails from a server, such as Microsoft Exchange. In comparison, webmail
products, such as Yahoo!, operate entirely in web browsers. Therefore, one would have to
download an email from a webmail account to a desktop to save an email copy, but no action
would be required with a desktop email client.
78. Id. at 247.
79. See id. at 248.
80. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986) (“If the intended addressee subscribes to
the service, the message is stored by the company’s computer ‘mail box’ until the subscriber calls
the company to retrieve its mail, which is then routed over the telephone system to the recipient’s
computer. If the addressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail company can put
the message onto paper and then deposit it in the normal postal system.” (emphasis added)). One
can only imagine a millennial’s reaction to this suggestion.
81. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 248–49 (Pleicones, J., concurring in the judgment).
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backup copies the service provider makes.82 Because Lee’s emails were
not also copies his service provider made for backup, Justice Pleicones
concurred that the emails were not protected under the SCA.83
Overall, each of the court’s opinions sheds some light on the evident
inconsistencies when interpreting the SCA. Beginning with the most
conservative interpretation, Chief Justice Toal’s argument makes sense
from a strict textualist perspective. “And” is a coordinating conjunction,
which would require the satisfaction of both paragraphs (A) and (B); to
modify this meaning would constitute legislating from the bench.84 In
keeping with the traditional view of the SCA,85 Chief Justice Toal
highlighted that the Theofel rationale has produced inconsistent results
depending on email technology.86 It seems highly unlikely that the
legislators wanted SCA protections to differ between desktop and webbased emails services, given that the intent of the SCA was to bring the
security of electronic correspondence to parity with first-class mail.87
Although Chief Justice Toal desired to avoid “interpretations of a statute
which would produce absurd results” in light of legislative history,88 it is
equally frustrating that the SCA does not adequately protect the modern
use of email inboxes, which could be accomplished via judicial action or,
at least, by a suggestion to legislators.
Justice Pleicones did not add much to the landscape in his short
concurrence. In viewing paragraphs (A) and (B) as necessarily distinct,
perhaps because temporary intermediate storage and a service provider’s
decision to back up an email could occur independently from one another,
Justice Pleicones’s interpretation did not vary much in substance from
Chief Justice Toal’s.
Justice Hearn’s plurality opinion proved to be more open yet
somewhat arbitrary. Despite his indication that no decision would be
made in adopting either the traditional DOJ interpretation or the Theofel
interpretation of the SCA, Justice Hearn, perhaps unintentionally,
endorsed user intent as a compelling factor relating to “backup
protection” in the same vein as Theofel. In analyzing “backup protection,”
82. See id. at 249. This interpretation suggests that Justice Pleicones advocates for an “or”
as opposed to an “and” interpretation.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
85. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123.
86. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247–48 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771–72 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (highlighting that users of
web-based email systems, such as Hotmail, are not protected under Theofel by Hotmail’s default
interface, in contrast to users of desktop email systems, such as Microsoft Outlook, who are
protected).
87. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
88. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 247 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)).
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Justice Hearn concluded that Lee’s emails could not be considered
backed up specifically because Lee did not take positive action to move
the emails from his Yahoo! inbox to another location.89 If Justice Hearn
did not consider user intent relevant, it would not have mattered even if
Lee had taken the positive action to move his emails because the
traditional view of the SCA only considers “backup protection” as
relevant to the ISP’s needs, not the email user’s. It also seems
questionable that Justice Hearn’s view of user intent could not also
include “doing nothing” because Lee’s emails were arguably “backed up”
and accessible just as easily by leaving them in his Yahoo! inbox as by
downloading them to his desktop or paying for separate storage. At any
rate, Justice Hearn showed sympathy to the Theofel interpretation without
formally endorsing it.
B. Expanding the Protection of Opened Emails—The Ninth Circuit’s
Focus on User Intent and the Eighth Circuit’s Subsequent Temperance
Consistent with its reputation for having a more expansive
jurisprudence,90 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit broke
away from the traditional interpretation of “electronic storage” and
protections provided to opened emails in Theofel. Ironically, the Theofel
and Jennings courts justified their conclusions using the same rationale:
the plain meaning of the statutory language.91 Theofel is arguably the
seminal case in distinguishing itself from the “traditional” interpretation
of the SCA,92 supporting perhaps a more modern conception of email in
effectuating the email user’s intent over the ISP’s intent. Further, while
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the
importance of user intent emphasized in Theofel, the court in Anzaldua
placed constraints on the subject without clear-cut rules, narrowing the
concept but making results less predictable for the public.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Hearing on: Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. 12–13 (2018) (written testimony of Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law,
Vanderbilt Law School). From 1994 to 2015, the Ninth Circuit was reversed more than 2.5 times
as often as the least reversed circuits and 44% more often than the next closest circuit, the Sixth
Circuit. Id. See also Rush Limbaugh, Keeping an Eye on the Ninth Circus, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2017/02/09/keeping-a-sharp-eye-on-the9th-circus/ [https://perma.cc/U8E6-GQXF] (applying the nickname “Ninth Circus” and
stereotyping the court as uniquely progressive).
91. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245 (referencing Merriam-Webster Dictionary); id. at 246
(Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Webster’s Dictionary). Chief Justice Toal’s
concurrence stressed the plain meaning of the conjunction “and.” Id. at 247.
92. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123. The traditional interpretation,
as set forth by the Department of Justice, requires that an item satisfy both § 2510(17)(A) and (B)
in order to qualify as being in “electronic storage.” See id. at 123–24.
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To continue illustrating the recurring friction of the SCA between
private parties, a discussion of the facts of Theofel and Anzaldua is useful.
In Theofel, officers of Integrated Capital Associates (ICA) had pending
litigation against the defendant, Farey-Jones.93 During discovery, the
attorney for Farey-Jones issued an overly broad subpoena to ICA’s ISP,
Netgate, for production of emails.94 Believing the subpoena was a
legitimate order, Netgate did not challenge the subpoena and decided to
provide garden variety emails to Farey-Jones without notifying ICA’s
officers.95 The emails were post-delivery copies that were left on
Netgate’s servers.96 Most of the emails provided did not relate to the
ongoing litigation, and many were privileged.97 Needless to say, the
magistrate judge berated Farey-Jones’s attorney for the egregious
subpoena, which resulted in fines.98 ICA’s officers filed a separate civil
suit alleging, inter alia, that Farey-Jones’s actions regarding the subpoena
violated the SCA, but the district court held that the SCA did not apply
because Netgate had granted Farey-Jones access to the emails.99
As a baseline, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the quashed subpoena
was consistent with the “unauthorized access” element of § 2701 of the
SCA.100 The court’s comparison of the scenario to the common law tort
of trespass is illustrative. Just as it would be trespass under common law
to physically access, under false pretenses, a storage facility holding
sensitive documents, so would it be a violation of the SCA to access
electronic storage without permission.101 Such a rationale seems parallel
with Congress’s intent to bring the protection of electronic
correspondence to parity with older methods of communication.102
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale regarding “electronic storage” made
Theofel the seminal case on the issue, departing from the DOJ’s
traditional interpretation of the SCA.103 Holding that the “electronic
storage” element could be satisfied by meeting § 2510(17)(A) or (B),104
93. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).
94. Id. The subpoena should have only been for emails related to the litigation, but was
rather for “all emails sent or received by anyone,” without regard to date. Id. The magistrate judge
found the subpoena “patently unlawful.” Id. at 1071–72.
95. Id. at 1071. “Garden variety” is this Note’s term—Circuit Judge Kozinski described
Netgate’s provision of 339 emails as a “free sample” in a “Baskin-Robbins” approach of
complying with the subpoena. Id. at 1071.
96. Id. at 1075.
97. Id. at 1071.
98. Id. at 1071–72.
99. Id. at 1072.
100. Id. at 1072, 1074–75.
101. Id. at 1072–73 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 78 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
102. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 48, 50.
103. See DOJ ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 123.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
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Theofel drastically increased the categories of emails (or other electronic
communications) that are protected under the SCA.105 As Justice Hearn
recognized in Jennings, Theofel’s broader interpretation has become the
majority view in a little over half a decade,106 with numerous courts
following suit.107 By further recognizing that ICA’s emails were
undisputedly stored “by an electronic communication service,” the
Theofel court identified that the only issue at hand was whether the emails
on Netgate’s servers were stored “for purposes of backup protection.”108
From the Ninth Circuit’s perspective, the emails located on Netgate’s
servers were indeed stored for purposes of “backup protection” by the
plain meaning of the statutory language.109 Rather than disapprove of the
“passive inaction” in leaving opened emails on Netgate’s server, which
Justice Hearn later did in Jennings,110 the Ninth Circuit held that an
“obvious purpose” of leaving the emails on the server was to recall them
again, and that Netgate’s copy functioned as a “backup” for the user.111
Emphasizing the importance of user intent, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that ICA’s previously opened emails on Netgate’s server were indeed
protected under the SCA, and thus reversed the district court’s
decision.112
By focusing on user intent, the Theofel court’s interpretation of the
SCA made the statute more “user-friendly,” placing the decision-making
regarding storage in the hands of the user. Should the users not ultimately
decide how they go about managing their own emails? In a world of cheap
(or often free) electronic storage, why should an email user feel
compelled to take immediate action on emails, such as downloading,
105. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76 (indicating that the government’s interpretation of the
SCA makes subsection (B) superfluous because, if the law only applies to unopened emails in
one’s inbox, then the emails are already protected under subsection (A)). But see Fraser v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633–34, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that “backup protection” under subsection (B) does not extend protection to post-transmission storage), aff’d
in part and vacated in part, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit critiqued Fraser’s
interpretation as also rendering subsection (B) substantially without effect by stipulating that
“backup protection” only applies to temporary backup storage pending delivery and not to any
“post-transmission” activities. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76.
106. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2012).
107. See, e.g., Strategic Wealth Grp., LLC v. Canno, No. 10-0321, 2011 WL 346592, at *3–
4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2011); Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. Prod. Input Sols., LLC, 789 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1055 (N.D. Iowa 2011); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at *5
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 983 (C.D. Cal.
2010); United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
108. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 245. Justice Hearn disagreed with the reasoning in Theofel,
holding that backup protection required some form of affirmative act rather than simply leaving
the emails on the server. Id.
111. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
112. See id. at 1077.
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categorizing, or deleting them? While the Theofel opinion is in some
ways satisfying because of its emphasis on user intent, its reasoning raises
other problems. In countering the government’s argument that the SCA
only required that the original message be temporary rather than the
backup, the Ninth Circuit introduced the concept of an email’s “lifespan”:
But the lifespan of a backup is necessarily tied to that of the
underlying message. Where the underlying message has
expired in the normal course, any copy is no longer
performing any backup function. An ISP that kept
permanent copies of temporary messages could not fairly be
described as “backing up” those messages.113
As a result, the Theofel court prized the concept of user intent, but,
perhaps inadvertently, placed a potentially arbitrary limit on the use of
inboxes as a permanent repository for open emails. When or how does an
underlying email “expire in normal course”? Is it a specific number of
days, or when a certain action occurs? The Theofel court’s reasoning on
this issue leaves itself open to attack—particularly given the evidence
regarding the SCA’s legislative history114—and has led to a narrowing
and speculation of user intent, rather than a general acceptance of the
concept.115
Further, the Theofel opinion both produces different results depending
on email technology and creates certain public policy concerns. To
clarify, the plaintiffs in Theofel received emails via a traditional desktop
client, which received the emails on a server before downloading copies
to the plaintiffs’ hard drives.116 It was a two-step process. In contrast,
emails delivered to web-based email accounts remain solely in the cloud
113. Id. at 1076.
114. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 246 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that
the legislative history supported that § 2510(17)(B) of the SCA valued the administrative purposes
of the service provider, rather than the user’s intent or preferences) (“An understanding of the
structure of the SCA indicates that the backup provision of the definition of electronic storage
exists only to ensure that the government cannot make an end-run around the privacy-protecting
ECS rules by attempting to access backup copies of unopened e-mails made by the ISP for its
administrative purposes. ISPs regularly generate backup copies of their servers in the event of a
server crash or other problem, and they often store these copies for the long term. . . . The statutory
focus on backup copies in the SCA was likely inspired by the 1985 Office of Technology
Assessment report that had helped inspire the passage of the SCA. The report highlighted the
special privacy threats raised by backup copies, which the report referred to as copies ‘[r]etained
by the [e]lectronic [m]ail [c]ompany for [a]dministrative [p]urposes.’” (alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Kerr, supra note 26, at 1217 n.61)).
115. See Kerr, supra note 25; see also Kerr, supra note 26, at 1218 (noting the ambiguous
standard of “whether the user or employees of the service provider have reason to believe that
they may need to access an additional copy of the file in the future”).
116. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075. Arguably, this is the traditional or original form of email,
which still is common with employers seeking enhanced security for electronic communication.
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on the provider’s server. Despite the prioritization of user intent, Theofel
maintained that in scenarios in which a “remote computing service” was
the only repository of a user’s emails, the emails would not be considered
backups.117 Web-based email inboxes have traditionally been considered
“remote computing services” in their capacity of holding opened emails
on their servers and therefore have not been protected under the SCA in
the same fashion.118
In relying on Theofel’s logic, other cases have produced results in
which web-based email users, which constituted the highest percentage
of email users by far in 2020, were not protected under the statute. For
example, in United States v. Weaver,119 the district court held as follows:
Users of web-based email systems, such as Hotmail, default
to saving their messages only on the remote system. A
Hotmail user can opt to connect an email program, such as
Microsoft Outlook, to his or her Hotmail account and
through it download messages onto a personal computer, but
that is not the default method of using Hotmail. Thus, unless
a Hotmail user varies from default use, the remote
computing service is the only place he or she stores
messages, and Microsoft is not storing that user’s opened
messages for backup purposes.
....
Previously opened emails stored by Microsoft for
Hotmail users are not in electronic storage . . . .120
Such unequal results under Theofel’s logic motivated Chief Justice Toal’s
concurrence in Jennings.121
While Theofel solidified a competing minority view among some
district courts of the SCA’s definition of electronic storage and prized the
importance of user intent in backing up emails,122 the Eighth Circuit, in
Anzaldua, acknowledged the idea of user intent but restricted the scope
of backup protection.123 The circumstances behind Anzaldua are also
indicative of continued issues with the unauthorized access of email by
private parties rather than government interference. In Anzaldua, a
paramedic (Anzaldua) worked for the local fire district and received a

117. Id. at 1076–77.
118. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1216.
119. 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
120. Id. at 772–73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
121. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 246–47 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
122. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075–76.
123. See Kerr, supra note 25.
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reprimand from the fire chief for neglect of property.124 After a further
incident involving inflammatory correspondence, which resulted in his
temporary suspension,125 Anzaldua sent an email to a reporter for a large
regional newspaper, which discussed alleged safety concerns and
misappropriation of department funds.126 Anzaldua specifically requested
to remain anonymous.127 Despite this attempt at a whistleblower
complaint, a copy of the email was mysteriously forwarded from
Anzaldua’s own Gmail account to the fire chief.128 As a result, Anzaldua
was terminated from his position at the fire district.129
In bringing his lawsuit to the district court, Anzaldua claimed, inter
alia, that his ex-girlfriend and the fire chief had accessed his Gmail
account to forward his whistleblower email to the fire district.130 In
support of his theory, Anzaldua indicated that he had traced the account
activity to an IP address at or near a restaurant the fire chief owned and
where Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend worked.131 Similar to the Hately case
discussed below,132 Anzaldua had provided his ex-girlfriend with his
Gmail password for a limited purpose—in this case, to only send resumes
to potential employers—but their romantic relationship had ended over a
year prior.133 Although the SCA complaint contained other errors, the
district court saw a leave to amend the complaint as futile because
Anzaldua had provided his ex-girlfriend with access to his account.134
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that Anzaldua had sufficiently
pleaded the unauthorized access claim135 but affirmed the denial to amend
124. Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2015).
125. Id. at 827–28. After the incident regarding neglect of equipment, Anzaldua alleged that
he drafted an email to a university professor on his personal computer but never sent it. Id. at 827.
Despite this testimony, the email was sent from his Gmail account to the professor and made it
back into the hands of the fire district chief. Id. While Anzaldua included this email to support his
SCA claims, it seemed clear (and the court agreed) that a draft email was not included in the SCA
because it had not yet been transmitted. Id. at 827, 840.
126. Id. at 828–29.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 829.
129. Id. at 830.
130. Id. at 831, 837–38.
131. Id. at 838. Specifically, Anzaldua alleged the forwarding of the whistleblower email
from Anzaldua’s “sent” box and subsequent deletion of this activity occurred at or near the fire
chief’s restaurant. Id.
132. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 774 (4th Cir. 2019). Given that Hately and his girlfriend
had separated, it was presumed that she no longer had permission to utilize Hately’s email
account. See id.
133. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 838.
134. Id. (noting that the complaint was already deficient because it did not appropriately state
an SCA claim).
135. Id. It seemed apparent to the Eighth Circuit that, taking Anzaldua’s story as true, the
ex-girlfriend exceeded the scope of permission granted to her. Such a rationale would be
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because the email would not have qualified as being in electronic storage
“for purposes of backup protection.”136 Anzaldua relied on Theofel’s
logic, stating that the whistleblower email left in his sent folder served as
a backup in case he ever needed to download it again.137 Recognizing that
Theofel had been controversial, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that even if it
adopted Theofel’s user-friendly “lifespan of a backup” approach, the
email would still not be considered an intended backup. 138 While user
intent is a flexible doctrine and can account for “passive inaction,”139 the
Eighth Circuit was not as receptive to this idea as the Theofel court.
Anzaldua claimed that the sent email remained on Gmail’s servers “as a
matter of course,” which prompted the Eighth Circuit to reason that
Anzaldua did not intend to use the copy as a backup.140 Rather, Theofel’s
logic would only apply to protect an email stored on the reporter’s email
system and not Anzaldua’s Gmail account.141
Anzaldua’s argument proves intriguing if one subscribes to the
concept that the “SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the
privacy of stored Internet communications,”142 but the Eighth Circuit, in
drawing its conclusions, also misconstrued Theofel’s reasoning. Much of
Theofel’s logic prized the idea of user intent and the concept of a
“lifespan” or “normal course” of a message (and its corresponding
backups).143 Anzaldua quoted Theofel in stating that just because “a copy
could serve as a backup does not mean it is stored for that purpose”;
however, Anzaldua failed to mention further context.144 The examples
Theofel used to identify copies “not in electronic storage” were ones that
were in direct correspondence with the ISP’s staff or messages that a user
had flagged for the ISP’s deletion.145 Both of these examples seem
uncommon, however. Neither of these examples suggests that using
email as normal, such as keeping emails in one’s inbox during
correspondence, would inherently disqualify emails as being in storage.
Further, the plaintiffs in Theofel left their opened emails on Netgate’s
servers146 and presumably knew that their “inaction” would leave these
consistent with Theofel’s reasoning regarding the common law tort of trespass—one can only use
another’s land within the scope of permission.
136. Id. at 838–39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)).
137. Id. at 840 (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2004)).
138. Id. at 842.
139. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012) (noting Justice Hearn’s
criticism of simply leaving an opened email in one’s inbox).
140. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842.
141. Id.
142. Kerr, supra note 26, at 1214.
143. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
144. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842 (emphasis added) (quoting Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076).
145. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076.
146. Id. at 1075–76.
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emails in storage, making them available for future reference. Thus, it
does not seem to follow that the Eighth Circuit did not allow Anzaldua to
rely on the functionality of his email account—as the Ninth Circuit
allowed the plaintiffs in Theofel to do—to keep his “sent” email in storage
because he knew that “sent” emails remained in storage.147 While
Theofel’s “normal course” and “lifespan” doctrines are not friendly
toward permanent or automatic storage,148 it would hardly seem
reasonable that Anzaldua’s recent email correspondence with a reporter
could not be considered within the “lifespan” of a sent message retained
as a backup given the short period of time that elapsed from him sending
the message and awaiting a response from the reporter.149
C. Hately v. Watts—The Fourth Circuit’s Focus on Modern Email
Services: Satisfying Common Sense
Hately further reiterates the role of email in the daily lives and
relationships of everyday people—in a way not too dissimilar to
Jennings, but with the opposite result. Again, the background and facts
of the case set a relevant stage. From August 2011 to February 2015,
Hately and his girlfriend, Torrenzano, had an intimate relationship
resulting in two children.150 During their relationship, they shared their
log-in information for their email accounts, which were web-based email
accounts provided through Blue Ridge (their community college) and
hosted by Google.151 In March 2015, Torrenzano informed Hately that
she was having another intimate relationship with her co-worker, Watts;
Hately and Torrenzano separated.152 Hately’s email password remained
unchanged.153 In an effort to help Watts with his still-ongoing divorce,
Torrenzano alleged that Watts’s wife and Hately were having an affair.154
Torrenzano provided Watts with Hately’s email password to locate
emails that corroborated the alleged affair.155 Once Hately found out that
Watts accessed his opened emails, Hately filed a lawsuit, accusing Watts
of unlawfully accessing Hately’s emails under the SCA.156
In analyzing Hately’s claim that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment for Watts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
147. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842.
148. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076 (“An ISP that kept permanent copies of temporary
messages could not fairly be described as ‘backing up’ those messages.”).
149. See Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842.
150. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 774 (4th Cir. 2019).
151. Id. at 773–74.
152. Id. at 774.
153. Id.
154. Id. While the case facts are not crystal clear on this issue, it seems possible that
Torrenzano may have contrived Hately’s alleged affair.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Circuit emphasized the congressional intent and legislative history
behind the SCA.157 Making reference to the OTA’s 1985 Electronic
Surveillance and Civil Liberties study, the Fourth Circuit noted that prior
to the SCA’s enactment, the “legal protections for electronic mail [were]
‘weak, ambiguous, or non-existent’” and further expressed that
“electronic mail remain[ed] legally as well as technically vulnerable to
unauthorized surveillance.”158 The Fourth Circuit further provided
supplementary information from the Senate Report (and corresponding
House Report) that this legal vulnerability (1) “discourage[d] potential
customers from using innovative communications systems,” such as
email, (2) “encourage[d] unauthorized users to obtain access to
communications” without regard to consequences, and (3) “ero[ded]
th[e] . . . right [to privacy].”159 By providing this background, the Fourth
Circuit presented the SCA as a much-needed deterrent to those who might
infringe on the privacy of another’s electronic data.
Turning to whether Hately’s emails were protected under the SCA,
the Fourth Circuit began by accepting the basic framework of Theofel.
First, the court agreed with Theofel that the “‘prior access [was]
irrelevant’ [as] to whether emails [were] in ‘storage.’”160 Because
Hately’s emails were “reserved for future use” by being accessible on
Blue Ridge’s servers, irrespective of being opened, the court considered
these emails “in ‘storage’” per the SCA.161 Second, the court mirrored
Theofel again by holding that § 2510 could be satisfied by either (A) or
(B) because holding otherwise would render (B) superfluous.162
In addressing the issue of Hately’s emails being in “electronic
storage” by an “electronic communication service,” the Fourth Circuit
pushed past Theofel’s framework. Specifically, the SCA distinguishes
between “electronic communication services” and “remote computing
services.” An electronic communication service allows users to send and
receive electronic communications, whereas a remote computing service
provides computer storage or processing services to the public.163
Further, the SCA’s elevated protections only apply to electronic
communication services.164 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that
157. Id. at 782.
158. Id. at 783 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4 (1986) (quoting OTA ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 44)).
159. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-641, at 5) (alteration in original); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-647,
at 19 (1986).
160. Hately, 917 F.3d at 786 (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir.
2004)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 787.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining “electronic communication service”); id. § 2711(2)
(defining “remote computing service”).
164. See id. §§ 2701, 2703.
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Hately’s email account only functioned as a remote computing service
with respect to his opened emails, holding that email providers were by
definition electronic communication services and could function
simultaneously as both types of services.165
With regard to “electronic storage” for purposes of “backup
protection,” the Fourth Circuit discarded Theofel’s user intent argument
and sought coverage for web-based email services. Hately’s opened
emails were hosted by Google, a web-based provider, and such
technology uses redundant systems in multiple locations around the
world.166 Redundant systems generate numerous copies of emails on
different servers to prevent the destruction of email and ensure
accessibility.167 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a web-based provider
used these copies to its own benefit and administrative ease, as well as
for the protection of the user.168 In this same vein, while the court
acknowledged and arguably expanded user intent to include permanent
storage, the court focused on web-based email as a product and
highlighted that:
[T]he meaning of “backup protection” does not turn on
whether a user subjectively chose not to delete the email
after reading the message because the user wanted to keep
the message for backup protection. That is because the
purpose of the web-based email service in providing storage
for the message—storage that is a feature of the product the
web-based email service offers—is to afford the user a place
to store messages the user does not want destroyed. The webbased email service does not need to know why the user has
elected not to delete [a] particular message. Rather, the webbased email service recognizes that users who choose to use
a web-based email platform desire storage for read and
unread messages and therefore the web-based email service
provides such storage to meet user demand.”169
The Fourth Circuit also justified that web-based email technology
conformed to the SCA’s legislative history in how one accessed email.
The House Report stated that an electronic mail service, which held a
message in storage until the addressee “requested” it, was subject to

165. Hately, 917 F.3d at 789 (“[B]ecause an entity can simultaneously function as an
electronic communication service and a remote computing service, an entity’s status as a remote
computing service in no way precludes a determination that the entity also was acting as an
electronic communication service.”).
166. Id. at 791.
167. Id. at 791–92.
168. Id. at 793.
169. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4

682

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

§ 2701.170 The court noted that Hately’s email service held copies of his
messages in this capacity, Hately could “request” them as many times as
he wanted online, and nothing in the House report indicated that § 2701’s
protections were limited to the first time a message was “request[ed].”171
As a result, the court held that Hately’s opened emails stored by a webbased email were in electronic storage and protected under the SCA.172
While the Fourth Circuit’s decision to fill the gap and protect the
status of opened web-based emails was appreciated, practical, and
needed, its reasoning was at times a stretch; the court reasoned that
certain enumerated statements in the SCA and its legislative history did
not expressly exclude other alternatives. The questionable nature of this
reasoning can be seen in the court’s allowance for remote computing
services to overlap with electronic communication services, thereby
extending the protections afforded to the electronic communication
services under the SCA.173 The lower court’s interpretation that an email
provider could only be acting as one type of service or the other,
depending on the status of the email, also seemed plausible because they
were separately enumerated. Despite bending specific SCA provisions,
the Hately court seemed to run true to Congress’s overarching intent,
specifically to “fill in a ‘gap’ in the then-existing law as to ‘the protect[ion
of] the privacy and security of communications transmitted by . . . new
forms of telecommunications and computer technology,’ including
email.”174 Web-based email platforms, such as Gmail, seem to fall in
these “gaps” in the twenty-first century, just as the protections for email
in general were “weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent” compared to firstclass mail in the 1980s.175 Much like Chief Justice Toal’s opinion in
Jennings criticized Theofel’s conceptions of user intent and differing
email technologies as producing absurd results,176 the Fourth Circuit’s
rationale also sought to avoid “arbitrary and untenable ‘gap[s]’ in the
legal protection of electronic communications.”177 Indeed, the Fourth
170. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 63 (1986).
171. Hately, 917 F.3d at 794.
172. Id. at 794–98.
173. Id. at 788 (“But nothing in the plain language of the definitions of electronic
communication service and remote computing service precludes an entity from simultaneously
functioning as both.”).
174. Id. at 797 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986)).
175. See OTA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 36, at 45.
176. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d. 242, 246–47 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
(citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)).
177. Hately, 917 F.3d at 798 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5) (“It defies logic that the
unopened junk and spam email messages that a user leaves in his or her inbox or designated folder
without opening would be entitled to more protection than those messages the user chooses to
open and retain. We do not believe Congress intended such an absurd result when it enacted a
statute intended to fill in the gaps in the then-existing privacy protections for electronic
communications and therefore spur adoption of new communication technologies, like email.”).
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Circuit did so rather successfully by bringing opened emails on webbased email servers into the fold.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the importance of the SCA cannot be understated. Providing
both civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized access to electronic
communications services,178 among other protections that restrict an
ISP’s disclosure of information to the government or other parties,179 the
SCA serves as an important deterrent in maintaining a civil society. Just
as first-class mail is protected from unauthorized access while in transit
or storage, so should electronic mail be protected from unauthorized
access—whether the email is opened or not.
However, considering protections were unclear for electronic mail in
the 1980s prior to the enactment of the SCA, “[i]t is not always easy to
square the decades-old SCA with the current state of email
technology.”180 Much about email use and technology has changed (and
continues to change) since 1986, but the protection of emails should not
depend on whether one uses a desktop-based email provider or web-based
provider. Further, emails should be protected from unauthorized access
whether they are unopened or opened. Unlike first-class mail, which
requires physical storage space, email services provide an easy and
compact way to store correspondence in a virtually unlimited capacity—
and the privacy of these documents should not be absolved in an arbitrary
manner.
Ensuring comprehensive email protections under the existing SCA
has proved tedious. By maintaining a strict textual reading of the SCA
and resisting the urge to legislate from the bench, a plurality of the
Jennings court declined to expand coverage of opened emails yet
acknowledged gaps in protection existed.181 While the Theofel and
Anzaldua courts sought to expand protection by emphasizing user intent,
their interpretations were also flawed in that user intent could be difficult
to prove regarding a user’s inaction and the protection differed in result
based on email technology. Only as recently as 2019 did the Hately court
succeed in expanding coverage to opened emails irrespective of whether
one uses a desktop or web-based email service, but it did so only by
skillfully maneuvering around statutory language and construing nearly
thirty-five-year-old legislative intent in its favor.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (criminal penalties); id. § 2707 (civil penalties).
179. Id. §§ 2702–2703.
180. Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 839 n.5 (8th Cir. 2015).
181. See Jennings, 736 S.E.2d at 248 (Toal, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The SCA is
ill-fitted to address many modern-day issues, but it is this Court’s duty to interpret, not legislate.”);
id. at 245 (“We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome’s actions give rise
to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior.”).
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Comprehensive email protection remains irregular outside of the
Fourth Circuit. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Theofel
in 2004 and in Jennings in 2013, the recent decision in Hately brings hope
that other circuits and the Supreme Court will adopt the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of the SCA to expand protection to all opened and
unopened emails, regardless of email technology—or that Congress will
revise the SCA accordingly.
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